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Abstract
In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditional-
izing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal
logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the
hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on
which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy
are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal
companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of
belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions
is not finitely axiomatizable.
Keywords Modal logic · Bayesian inference · Bayes learning · Bayes logic ·
Medvedev frames
1 Introduction and Overview
Let (X,B, p) be a classical probability measure space with B a Boolean algebra
of subsets of set X and p a probability measure on B. In Bayesian belief revision
elements in B stand for the propositions that an agent regards as possible statements
about the world, and the probability measure p represents an agent’s prior degree of
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belief in the truth of these propositions. Learning proposition A in B to be true, the
agent revises his prior p on the basis of this evidence and replaces p with q(·) =
p(· | A), where p(· | A) is the conditional probability given by Bayes’ rule:
p(B | A)
.
=
p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
∀B ∈ B (1)
This new probability measure q can be regarded as the probability measure that the
agent infers from p on the basis of the information (evidence) that A is true. The
aim of this paper is to study the logical aspects of this type of inference from the
perspective of modal logic.
Why modal logic? We will see in Section 2 that it is very natural to regard the
move from p to q in terms of modal logic: The core idea is to view A in the Bayes’
rule (1) as a variable and say that a probability measure q can be inferred from p
if there exits an A in B such that q(·) = p(· | A). Equivalently, we will say in this
situation that “q can be (Bayes) learned from p”. That “it is possible to obtain/learn
q from p” is clearly a modal talk and calls for a logical modeling in terms of concepts
of modal logic.
Bayesian belief revision is just a particular type of belief revision: Various rules
replacing Bayes’s rule have been considered in the context of belief change (e.g.
Jeffrey conditionalization, maxent principle; see [20] and [5]), and there is a huge
literature on other types of belief revision as well. Without completeness we mention:
the AGM postulates in the seminal work of Alchourro´n–Ga¨rdenfors–Makinson [1];
the dynamic epistemic logic [19]; van Benthem’s dynamic logic for belief revision
[18]; probabilistic logics, e.g. Nilsson [16]; and probabilistic belief logics [2]. For
an overview we also refer to Ga¨rdenfors [6]. Typically, in this literature beliefs are
modeled by sets of formulas defined by the syntax of a given logic and axioms about
modalities are intended to prescribe how a belief represented by a formula should be
modified when new information and evidence are provided.
Viewed from the perspective of such theories of belief revision our intention in this
paper is very different: Rather than trying to give a plausible set of axioms intended
to capture desired features of statistical inference we take the standard Bayes model
and we aim at an in-depth study of this model from a purely logical perspective. Our
investigation is motivated by two observations. First, the logical properties of this
type of belief change do not seem to have been studied in terms of the modal logic
that we see emerging naturally in connection with Bayesian belief revision. Second,
Bayesian probabilistic inference is relevant not only for belief change: Bayesian con-
ditionalization is the typical and widely applied inference rule also in situations where
probability is interpreted not as subjective degree of belief but as representing objec-
tive matters of fact. Finding out the logical properties of this type of probabilistic
inference has thus a wide interest going way beyond the confines of belief revision.
The structure of the paper is the following. After some motivation, in Section 2 the
modal logic of Bayesian probabilistic inference (we call it “Bayes logic”) is defined
in terms of possible world semantics. The set of possible worlds will be the set of all
probability measures on a measurable space (X,B). The accessibility relation among
probability measures will be the “Bayes accessibility” relation, which expresses that
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the probability measure q is accessible from p if q(·) = p(· | A) for some A (Defi-
nition 2.1). We will see that probability measures on (X,B) with X having different
cardinalities determine different Bayes logics. The inclusion relation of these Bayes
logics is clarified by Theorem 4.1 in Section 4: the different Bayes logics are all com-
parable, and the larger the cardinality ofX, the smaller the logic. The standard modal
logical features of the Bayes logics are determined in Section 3 (see Proposition 3.1).
In Section 5 we establish a connection between Bayes logics and the modal counter-
part of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems [14, 15]. We will prove (Theorem 5.2)
that the Bayes logic determined by the set of probability measures over (X,B) with a
finite or countable X coincides with the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s
logic. This entails that the Bayes logic determined by probability spaces on finite
X (hence with finite Boolean algebras B) is not finitely axiomatizable (Proposition
5.9). This result is clearly significant because it indicates that axiomatic approaches
to belief revision might be severely limited. The paper [8] deals with finite non-
axiomatizability of Bayes logics over standard Borel spaces; however, it remains
an open question whether general Bayes logics are finitely axiomatizable (Problem
5.11). Section 6 indicates future directions of research.
2 Motivation and Basic Definitions
Let 〈X,B〉 be a measurable space with a probability measure p on B, and consider
statements such as
φ
.
= “the probability of A is at least 1/4 and at most 1/2” (2)
ψ
.
= “the probability of B is 1/7” (3)
where A and B are in B. Truth-values of propositions φ and ψ can be meaningfully
defined with respect to the probability measure p:
p  φ if and only if 1/4 ≤ p(A) ≤ 1/2 (4)
p  ψ if and only if p(B) = 1/7 (5)
Consider now a statement χ such as
χ
.
= “it can be learned that the probability of A is at least 1/4 and at most 1/2” (6)
= “it can be learned that φ” (7)
In view of the interpretation of Bayes’ rule formulated in the Introduction, it is very
natural to define χ to be true at probability measure p if there is a B in B such that
the conditional probability measure q(·)
.
= p(· | B) makes true the proposition
φ = “the probability of A is at least 1/4 and at most 1/2” (8)
where “true” is understood in the sense of Eq. 4; i.e. if for some B ∈ B we have
1/4 ≤ q(A) = p(A | B) ≤ 1/2 (9)
Propositions such as χ in Eqs. 6–7 are obviously of modal character and it is thus
very natural to express this modality formally using the modal operator ♦ by writing
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the sentence χ as ♦φ. In view of Eq. 7 the reading of ♦φ is “φ can be learned in a
Bayesian manner”.
Thus we model Bayesian learning by specifying a standard unimodal language
given by the grammar
a | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | ♦ϕ (10)
defining formulas ϕ, where a belongs to a nonempty countable set V ar of proposi-
tional letters. As usual  abbreviates ¬♦¬. (We refer to the books [3, 4] concerning
basic notions in modal logic).
Models of such a language are tuples M = 〈W,R, [| · |]〉 based on frames F =
〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set, R a binary relation on W and [| · |] : V ar →
℘(W) is an evaluation of propositional letters. Truth of a formula ϕ at world w is
defined in the usual way
• M, w  a ⇐⇒ w ∈ [|a|] for propositional letters a ∈ V ar .
• M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w  ϕ andM, w  ψ .
• M, w  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w  ϕ.
• M, w  ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there is v such that wRv andM, v  ϕ.
By definition formula ϕ is valid over a frame F , F  ϕ in symbols, if and only if it
is true at every point in every model based on the frame. For a class C of frames the
modal logic of C is the set of all modal formulas that are valid on every frame in C:
(C) =
{
φ : (∀F ∈ C) F  φ
}
(11)
We denote by M(X,B) the set of all probability measures over 〈X,B〉. M(X,B)
is non-empty as the Dirac measures δx for x ∈ X always belong to M(X,B). We
assume, without loss of generality, that elementary events {x} for x ∈ X always
belong to the algebra B. It follows that for a finite or countably infinite X, B must be
the powerset algebra ℘(X). In case B = ℘(X), we write MX instead of M(X,B).
If X is countable then the support of v ∈ MX is defined to be the set supp(v) =
{x ∈ X : v({x}) = 0}. A measure v ∈ MX is called faithful if it has full support
supp(v) = X, or equivalently v(H) = 0 iff H = ∅, or v(H) = 1 iff H = X. In case
of a countable X for every probability measure v ∈ MX there exists x ∈ X such that
v({x}) > 0.
For a fixed 〈X,B〉 the set of possible worlds W is defined to be the set of
probability measuresM(X,B). Consider again the sentences
φ
.
= “the probability of A is at least 1/4 and at most 1/2” (12)
ψ
.
= “the probability of B is 1/7” (13)
The core idea of the semantic of the introduced modal language describing Bayesian
statistical inference is the following:
• The intended interpretation of φ and ψ are the sets
[|φ|] =
{
p ∈ M(X,B) : 1/4 ≤ p(A) ≤ 1/2
}
(14)
[|ψ |] =
{
p ∈ M(X,B) : p(B) = 1/7} (15)
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• The intended interpretation of ♦φ is that “φ can be learned in a Bayesian
manner”:
[|♦φ|] =
{
p ∈ M(X,B) : there is A ∈ B such that p(· | A)  φ
}
(16)
This intended interpretation suggests the following definition of the accessibility
relation R onW = M(X,B):
Definition 2.1 For v,w ∈ M(X,B)we say thatw is Bayes accessible from v if there
is anA ∈ B such thatw(·) = v( · | A). In this context,A is called an evidence. Bayes
accessibility relation is denoted by R(X,B), or in case B = ℘(X), simply by RX.
We are now in a position to give the definition of one of the central concepts of
this paper.
Definition 2.2 (Bayes frames) Let 〈X,B〉 be a measurable space. The structure
F(X,B) = 〈M(X,B), R(X,B)〉 (17)
is called a Bayes frame. In case B = ℘(X), we use the notation
FX = 〈MX, RX〉 (18)
We define a Bayes model as a model M = 〈M(X,B), R(X,B), [| · |]〉 based on
a Bayes frame F(X,B). The modal logic (F(X,B)) corresponds then to the set of
laws of Bayesian learning based on the frameF(X,B). The general laws of Bayesian
learning independent of the particular representation 〈X,B〉 of the events is then the
modal logic
BL = {φ : (∀ Bayes frames F) F  φ} (19)
From the point of view of applications the most important classes of Bayes frames
are the frames FX with X = n (a finite ordinal) or X = ω (the smallest infinite
ordinal). We will see that finiteness of X serves as a dividing line when defining
the logic of Bayes frames. To indicate these frames we make use of the following
notation
Fn = 〈Mn, Rn〉, Fω = 〈Mω, Rω〉 (20)
Definition 2.3 (Bayes logics) We define a family of normal modal logics based on
finite or countable or countably infinite or all Bayes frames as follows.
BLn = {φ : Fn  φ} (21)
BL<ω = {φ : (∀n ∈ N) Fn  φ} (22)
BLω = {φ : Fω  φ} (23)
BL≤ω = BL<ω ∩ BLω (24)
BL = {φ : (∀ Bayes frames F) F  φ} (25)
We call BL<ω (resp. BL≤ω) the logic of finite (resp. countable) Bayes frames; how-
ever, observe that the set of possible worlds M(X,B) of a Bayes frame F(X,B)
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is finite if and only if X is a one-element set, otherwise it is at least of cardinality
continuum.
One can easily check the inclusions
BL ⊆ BL≤ω ⊆ BLω and BL ⊆ BL<ω ⊆ BLn (26)
using the very definition of Bayes logics.
3 Modal Principles of Bayes Learning
In this section we discuss the connections of Bayes logic to a list of modal axioms
that are often considered in the literature. Such axioms are
K (φ → ψ)→ (φ → ψ)
T φ → φ
4 φ → φ
M ♦φ →♦φ
Grz ((φ → φ)→ φ)→ φ
Let us recall some of the standard frame properties corresponding to these axioms
(cf. [3] and [4]).
Logic Axioms Adequate frames
K K All frames
T K+T Reflexive frames
4 K+4 Transitive frames
S4 K+T+4 Preorders
S4.1 K+T+4+M Preorders in which every point sees an endpoint
S4.Grz K+T+4+Grz Preorders without infinite ascending chains
Let F = 〈W,R〉 be a frame. That every world in F sees and endpoint means
F |= ∀w∃u(wRu ∧ ∀v(uRv → u = v)). That there are no infinite ascending
chains in F means F |= ¬∃P((∀w ∈ P) ∃v(wRv ∧ v = w ∧ v ∈ P)).
As Bayes logics were defined to be the modal logics of certain frames, these logics
are normal modal logics (that is, they extend K). The next proposition establishes the
connection between the Bayes logics and the usual frame properties.
Proposition 3.1 The following statements hold:
(1) BL ⊇ S4 but BL ⊇ S4.1
(2) BL≤ω ⊇ S4.1
(3) BL<ω ⊇ S4.Grz while BLω ⊇ S4.Grz
Proof (1) LetF = 〈M(X,B), R(X,B)〉 be an arbitrary Bayes frame. To check BL ⊇
S4 we need to show that R(X,B) is a preorder (reflexive and transitive). To simplify
notation, we frequently write R instead of the longer R(X,B).
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• Reflexivity: for all measures w ∈ M(X,B) we have w(·) = w( · | X).
• Transitivity: suppose u, v,w ∈ M(X,B) with uRv and vRw, i.e. there are
A,B ∈ B with u(A) = 0, v(B) = 0 and we have v(·) = u( · | A) and
w(·) = v( · | B). Since v(B) = 0 and v(B) = u(B | A) we get u(B) = 0 and
thus u(A ∩ B) = 0, therefore w(·) = u( · | A ∩ B), which means uRw.
We note that the accessibility relation is also antisymmetric:
• Antisymmetry: If v(·) = w( · | A) and w(·) = v( · | B), then v(·) = v( · |
A ∩ B). This ensures v(A ∩ B) = 1, whence v(B) = 1 and thus v = w.
To see that BL ⊇ S4.1 it is enough to give an example for a Bayes frame that
does not validate the axiom M. Consider the frame F = 〈M([0, 1],B), R([0, 1],B)〉
where [0, 1] is the unit interval and B is the Borel σ -algebra. Let w be the Lebesgue
measure. We claim that
F |= ∃u(wRu ∧ ∀v(uRv → u = v)) (27)
For, suppose for some probability u we have wRu. Then u(·) = w( · | A) for some
Borel set A with w(A) = 0. Each Borel set A with non-zero Lebesgue measure
contains a Borel subset B  A with a strictly smaller but non-zero Lebesgue mea-
sure: 0 < w(B) < w(A). It is easy to see that from u = w( · | A) we can R-access
w( · | B) and since w(B) < w(A) we also have w( · | A) = w( · | B).
(2) In order to show BL≤ω ⊇ S4.1 it is enough to verify that for a countable
measurable space 〈X,B〉, the frame F(X,B) has end-points in the following sense.
• Endpoints: That R has endpoints means ∀w∃u(wRu ∧ ∀v(uRv → u = v)).
Pick an arbitrary w and let x ∈ X be such that w({x}) = 0. Such an x must
exist because X is countable. We claim that u = w( · | {x}) will be suitable. For
H ∈ ℘(X) we have
w(H | {x}) =
{
1 if x ∈ H
0 otherwise
Thus w( · | {x}) is the Dirac measure δx . If a measure is Bayes accessible from
δx , then it must be absolutely continuous with respect to δx and it is clear that δx
is the only such probability measure.
(3) Next, let us verify BL<ω ⊇ S4.Grz. To this end it is enough to show that no
Bayes frame F(X,B) with a finite X can contain an infinite R(X,B)-path. But this
follows from the fact that finiteness of X implies finiteness of B = ℘(X), whence
there are only finitely many elements in B that can serve as possible evidence for
conditionalizing a probability.
Finally, we prove Fω  Grz (thus BLω ⊇ S4.Grz). Let w ∈ M(N, ℘ (N)) be
a measure such that for all x ∈ N we have w({x}) = 0. Fix a sequence Ai =
N− {0, . . . , i} for i ∈ N. Then
w(·) R w(· | A0) R w(· | A1) R w(· | A2) · · · (28)
shows the failure of the Grzegorczyk axiom Grz in Fω.
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4 Inclusions Between Bayes Logics
Recall the inclusions that follow directly from the definition of Bayes logics:
BL ⊆ BL≤ω ⊆ BLω and BL ⊆ BL<ω ⊆ BLn (29)
In this section we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1 BL  BLω = BL≤ω  BL<ω  BLn+k  BLn
Some of the inclusions in the above theorem follow from Proposition 3.1. For
instance BL  BL≤ω is witnessed by S4.1 ⊆ BL≤ω but S4.1 ⊆ BL. To prove the
other inclusions, we establish several lemmas first.
For two framesF = 〈W,R〉 and G = 〈W ′, R′〉we writeFG ifF is (isomorphic
as a frame to) a generated subframe of G. We recall that if FG, then G  φ implies
F  φ, whence (G) ⊆ (F) (see Theorem 3.14 in [3] where the symbol֌ was
used instead of ).
Lemma 4.2 Fn  Fn+k  Fω, consequently BLω ⊆ BLn+k ⊆ BLn.
Proof Fix the frames Fn = 〈Mn, Rn〉, Fn+k = 〈Mn+k, Rn+k〉. To each w ∈ Mn
assign α(w) ∈ Mn+k defined by
α(w)(x) =
{
w(x) if x = 1, . . . , n
0 if x = n+ 1, . . . , n+ k
It can be checked that α establishes Fn  Fn+k . The case Fn  Fω is similar.
To see why the proper inclusion BLn+k  BLn holds we need some preparation.
In a frameF = 〈W,R〉 a sequence x0, x1, . . ., xk is called a path if xiRxi+1 for i < k
and xi = xj for i = j . The length of a path is the number of the xi’s in the sequence.
Define by recursion the following formulas
π1 = p1 (30)
π2 = p2 ∧ ¬p1 ∧ ♦π1 (31)
πn+1 = pn+1 ∧ ¬pn ∧ · · · ∧ ¬p1 ∧ ♦πn (32)
Lemma 4.3 Let F = 〈W,R〉 be a frame, M = 〈F, [| · |]〉 be a model, and x ∈ W .
• M, x  πn only if there is in F a path of length n starting from x.
• If there is in F a path of length n starting from x, then there is an evaluation [| · |],
such that in the corresponding model M we have M, x  πn.
• If F  ¬πn, then there is no path of length n in F .
Proof The proof is not hard and is left to the reader, we only visualize the idea of the
proof using Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 x3  π3 and its consequences
It is clear that if FX is a Bayes frame with a finite X, then there are only finitely
many elements in B that can serve as a possible evidence for conditionalizing a prob-
ability. From this it follows, that in these finite cases the maximal length of a path in
FX is smaller than the cardinality of the power set ℘(X). Therefore, for every n < m
there exists k such that
BLn ⊢ ¬πk while BLm ⊢ ¬πk (33)
This proves BLm = BLn.
Lemma 4.4 BL≤ω = BLω  BL<ω
Proof By Lemma 4.2 for each n we have BLω ⊆ BLn; so we also obtain
BLω ⊆
⋂
n BLn = BL<ω. Therefore, by the definition of BL≤ω, we achieve
BLω = BLω ∩ BL<ω = BL≤ω. Now, straightforward by Proposition 3.1(3), we get
the proper inclusion BLω  BL<ω.
5 Connection to theModal Logic of Medvedev Frames
We start by recalling first the notion of Medvedev frames. Such frames originate in
intuitionistic logic, for an overview about the history we refer to the book [4] and
to Shehtman [17]. The main purpose of this section is to establish a correspondence
between Bayes logics and the modal logics of Medvedev frames.
Definition 5.1 (Medvedev frames) A Medvedev frame is a frame that is isomorphic
(as a directed graph) to 〈℘(X) {∅},⊇〉 for a non-empty finite set X.
For convenience, as a slight abuse of notation, we will call every frame of the form
〈℘(X)  {∅},⊇〉 (X being finite or infinite) a Medvedev frame and we will use the
notation
P0X = 〈℘(X) {∅},⊇〉 (34)
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A hierarchy of normal modal logics that correspond to the framesP0X can be given:
MLn =
{
φ : P0n  φ
}
(35)
ML<ω =
{
φ : (∀n ∈ N) P0n  φ
}
(36)
MLω =
{
φ : P0ω  φ
}
(37)
ML≤ω = ML<ω ∩ MLω (38)
ML =
⋂
α
MLα (39)
Observe that for cardinals α < β we have P0α  P
0
β , consequently MLβ ⊆ MLα .
Since there are countably many modal formulas and proper class many cardinals,
there must exists a cardinal α0 such that the sequence MLα stabilizes, i.e. ML =
MLα0 or equivalently for all β ≥ α0 we have MLβ = MLα0 .
The main result of this section is the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2 Countable Bayes logics and the modal logics of countable Medvedev
frames coincide.
ML ⊆ MLω = ML≤ω  ML<ω  MLn
 = = = =
BL  BLω = BL≤ω  BL<ω  BLn
(40)
We prove Theorem 5.2 through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 5.3 P0X  FX for all finite or countably infinite set X.
Proof Take any w ∈ MX with full support supp(w) = X, and consider the subframe
Fw = 〈W,R〉 of FX generated by w. Elements of W are of the form w( · | H) for
some non-emptyH ⊆ supp(w). Now, ifH,H ′ ⊆ supp(w) are different subsets, then
1 = w(H | H) = w(H ′ | H) < 1. Therefore each element v ∈ W can be identified
with a non-empty subset H ⊆ supp(w). It is fairly easy to check that the mapping
H → w(· | H) establishes an isomorphism between Fw and P0X, which completes
the proof.
Lemma 5.3 implies BLω ⊆ MLω and BLn ⊆ MLn for all n > 0 and therefore
BL<ω ⊆ ML<ω. Next, we want to establish the converse inclusions.
Let F ։ G denote a surjective, bounded morphism between frames F and G.
Recall that if F ։ G, then F  φ implies G  φ, whence (F) ⊆ (G) (see
Theorem 3.14 in [3]). We also recall that (∀i) Fi  φ implies
⊎
Fi  φ (for the
definition of the disjoint union
⊎
of frames see Definition 3.13 in [3]). In the special
case when Fi = F it follows that (F) ⊆ (
⊎
F) (Theorem 3.14 in [3]).
Note that neither FX  P
0
X nor P
0
X ։ FX can hold if X is finite because the
underlying set MX of FX has the cardinality of continuum (for n > 1) while ℘(X)
is finite.
The Modal Logic of Bayesian Belief Revision
Lemma 5.4 MLω ⊆ BLω and MLn ⊆ BLn for all n > 0.
Proof Let X be a finite or countably infinite set. We prove
⊎
v∈F
P0X ։ FX (41)
for a suitable set F . This is enough since
⊎
v P
0
X ։ FX implies

(
P0X
)
⊆ 
( ⊎
v
P0X
)
⊆ 
(
FX
)
(42)
For |X| = n this means MLn ⊆ BLn and for X countably infinite it is MLω ⊆ BLω.
Consider the Bayes frame FX = 〈MX, RX〉.
Claim A. Faithful measures cannot be Bayes accessed. More precisely, if v is
faithful, then ∀u(uRXv → u = v). Indeed, suppose v(·) = u( · | A) for some
A ⊆ X, u(A) = 0. Then v(A) = u(A | A) = 1 thus faithfulness of v ensuresA = X.
But then v = u.
Claim B. If u is not faithful, then there is a faithful v such that vRXu. Suppose u
is not faithful. Take any faithful measure r over X  supp(u) and pick a real number
0 < c < 1. Define
v(H) = c · u(H ∩ supp(u))+ (1− c) · r(H ∩ (X  supp(u))) (43)
Then v is a faithful measure over X and v(H | supp(u)) = u(H).
Let F ⊆ MX be the set of all faithful measures. Let us denote the copy of P
0
X
corresponding to v ∈ F in the disjoint union by P0v = 〈Pv,⊇〉, where Pv = ℘(X)
{∅}. Define the mapping f as follows
f :
⊎
v∈F
P0v → FX, Pv ⊇ A → v( · | A) (44)
Let us verify that f is a surjective, bounded morphism
⊎
v∈F P
0
X ։ FX.
Surjectivity Pick a probability u ∈ MX. By Claim B there is a faithful v from which
u is accessible by an A ⊆ X. Then f (A) = v( · | A) = u(·).
Homomorphism We have to show that Pv ⊇ A ⊇ B implies f (B) is Bayes
accessible from f (A). Indeed, f (A) = v( · | A) and f (B) = v( · | B) and
v( · | A ∩ B) = v( · | B).
Zig–Zag Property We have to verify that if f (A)RXw, then there is a C such that
w = f (C) and A ⊇ C. Denote f (A) by u. Let v be the faithful measure such that
A ⊆ Pv . Then u = v( · | A), and by the assumption uRXw there is B ⊆ X such
that w(·) = u( · | B). Then w(·) = v( · | A ∩ B) = f (A ∩ B), therefore setting
C = A ∩ B completes the proof.
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So far we have proved BLω = MLω, BL<ω = ML<ω and BLn = MLn for all
n > 0. To complete the proof of Theorem 5.2 it remains to show BL  ML.
Lemma 5.5 BL  ML
Proof Every world in every Medvedev frame sees an endpoint, implying S4.1 ⊆
ML. By Proposition 3.1(1) we have S4.1 ⊆ BL, therefore BL = ML holds.
As for the inclusion BL ⊆ ML recall that there is a cardinal α0 such that ML =
MLα0 . It is enough to find a Bayes frame F such that P
0
α0
F because in such a case
we obtain
BL ⊆ (F) ⊆ (P0α0) = MLα0 = ML (45)
The construction of such a frame is interesting on its own and for this reason is
postponed to Proposition 5.6.
Putting together all the previous lemmas we arrive at Theorem 5.2:
ML ⊆ MLω = ML≤ω  ML<ω  MLn
 = = = =
BL  BLω = BL≤ω  BL<ω  BLn
(46)
Though we established BL = ML, the two logics are “close” to each other in the
sense of the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6 The logic of each Bayes frame can be dominated by the logic of a
Medvedev frame, and vice versa.
Proof #1: Proving that for all F = F(X,B) there exists P0 = P0Y such that(F) ⊆
(P0):
Take any F(X,B) and let Y ⊆ X be a finite, non-empty subset. Let v ∈ M(X,B)
be a probability measure such that supp(v) = Y . Then the subframe Fv generated
by v is isomorphic (as a directed graph) to P0Y (cf. the proof of Lemma 5.3), whence
P0Y  F(X,B). This implies (F(X,B)) ⊆ (P
0
Y ), as desired.
#2: Proving that for all P0 = P0Y there exists F = F(X,B) such that (P
0) ⊆
(F):
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.4. Take any P0Y and let X ⊆ Y be a finite,
non-empty subset. We need the following Lemma:
Lemma 5.7 If X ⊇ Y , then P0X ։ P
0
Y .
Proof of Lemma 5.7 Any surjection f : X → Y can be lifted up to a surjection
f+ : ℘(X) → ℘(Y ) via f+(H) = {f (h) : h ∈ H }. It can be checked that f+ is a
bounded morphism P0X ։ P
0
Y .
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Lemma 5.7 applies and we get P0Y ։ P
0
X. With FX = 〈MX, RX〉, X being finite,
following the proof of Lemma 5.4 one obtains
⊎
P0X ։ FX. Consequently⊎
P0Y ։
⊎
P0X ։ FX (47)
which implies
(P0Y ) ⊆ (
⊎
P0Y ) ⊆ (FX) (48)
Consequences Recall that if 〈X,B〉 is a finite probability space (with |X| > 1), then
the set of probability measuresM(X,B) has cardinality continuum. Therefore Bayes
frames F(X,B) over finite probability spaces are uncountable. Thus it is surprising
that despite the uncountability of Bayes frames the corresponding logic has the finite
frame property:
Proposition 5.8 The modal logic BL<ω of Bayes frames over a finite probability
space has the finite frame property.
Proof ML<ω is complete with respect to the set of (finite) Medvedev frames by
definition, and BL<ω = ML<ω by Theorem 5.2.
An immediate consequence is that BL<ω is complete with respect to a recur-
sive set of finite frames. Therefore, non-validities can be witnessed by finite
counterexamples.
The most remarkable consequence of the identification of Bayes logics with the
modal logics of Medvedev frames concerns the (non-)axiomatizability properties of
Bayes logics:
Proposition 5.9 The modal logics BL<ω and BLω of Bayes frames over respectively
finite or countably infinite probability spaces are not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof That ML<ω is not finitely axiomatizable is essentially contained in [13] (cf.
Corollary 8 in [17]). Shehtman [17] proves that MLα is not finitely axiomatizable for
any infinite α. Applying Theorem 5.2 completes the proof.
The previous proposition is philosophically significant: it tells us that there is no
finite set of formulas from which all general laws of Bayesian belief revision and
Bayesian learning based on probability spaces with a finite set of propositions can
be deduced. Bayesian learning and belief revision based on such simple probability
spaces are among the most important instances of probabilistic updatings because
they are widely used in applications. Proposition 5.9 says that the logic of such very
basic belief revisions cannot be captured by a finite set of axioms. If the axiomatic
approach to belief revision is not capable to characterize the logic of the simplest,
paradigm form of belief revision, then this casts doubt on the general enterprise that
aims at axiomatizations of belief revision systems.
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It is a longstanding hard open problem whether there are recursive axiomatiza-
tions for any of the logics MLα (α infinite), or ML<ω (and thus BL<ω), cf. [4],
Chapter 2. New logical systems did not shed light to this problem. Since the class of
(finite) Medvedev frames is a recursive class of finite frames, BL<ω is co-recursively
enumerable. It follows that if ML<ω is recursively axiomatizable, then BL<ω is
decidable. In the light of Theorem 5.2 we raise the following open problem.
Problem 5.10 Are BL<ω or BL recursively axiomatizable?
Countable Bayes logics can be characterized not only by the modal logic of
Medvedev frames but also by that of Kubin´ski frames: Łazarz [12] proved that
Medvedev’s and Kubin´ski’s logic coincide. Taking into account Theorem 5.2,
Łazarz’s result provides a lattice characterization of countable Bayes logics. For the
necessary definitions we refer to [12].
As mentioned above ML is not finitely axiomatizable. The inequality BL  ML
in Theorem 5.2 raises the following problem, which also remains open.
Problem 5.11 Is BL finitely axiomatizable?
We noted at the beginning of Section 5 that there exists a least cardinal α0 such
that ML = MLα0 . The exact value of α0 is not known.
Problem 5.12 What is the exact value of α0?
6 ClosingWords and Further Research Directions
In addition to standard Bayes conditionalization there are other Bayesian methods,
extensions of the standard one, of updating a probability measure: Jeffrey’s condi-
tionalization and conditionalization based on the concept of conditional expectations
(cf. [5, 9, 10]).
Let us first recall Jeffrey’s conditionalization. Suppose p ∈ M(X,B) is a prior
probability, {Ei}i<n is a finite partition of X with p(Ei) = 0 for all i, and we are
given a probability measure r : A → [0, 1], called the uncertain evidence, on the
subalgebra A of B generated by this partition. The Bayesian Agent updates his prior
probability p using the evidence r to get the posterior probability defined by the
“Jeffrey rule”:
q(H) =
∑
i<n
p(H | Ei)r(Ei) (49)
Given two measures p, q ∈ M(X,B) one can define Jeffrey accessibility in a manner
similar to Bayes accessibility: q is Jeffrey accessible from p if there is a partition
{Ei}i<n and uncertain evidence r such that Eq. 49 holds.
Jeffrey’s conditionalization is just a special case of the general conditionaliza-
tion based on the concept of conditional expectation introduced by Kolmogorov
[11] already (see [9] as well): Let S be the Borel σ -algebra of R. Recall that for
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p ∈ M(X,B) and A ≤ B the conditional expectation Ep(f | A) : X → R is
any (A,S)-measurable function that satisfies (50) below for all (B,S)-measurable
f : X → R ∫
Z
Ep(f | A) dp =
∫
Z
f dp for each Z ∈ A (50)
Such a function exists and is unique p-almost everywhere. Let
dq
dp
: X → R denote
the Radon–Nikodym derivative of q with respect to p. We say that q can be inferred
from p using general conditionalization if q is absolutely continuous with respect to
p and there is a σ -subalgebra A of B such that
q(H) =
∫
H
Ep
(
dq
dp
∣∣∣∣A
)
dp (51)
for all H ∈ B. If q can be inferred from p in this way, we say that q is generally
Bayes accessible from p.
One can now define the modal logics based on Bayes frames F(X,B), where the
accessibility relation is replaced with either Jeffrey accessibility or with the more
general accessibility using conditional expectations. The basic logical properties of
Jeffrey accessibility have been studied in the paper [7] and frame properties of acces-
sibility using conditional expectations have been investigated in [9]. It has been
proven in [7] that Jeffrey accessibility is also not finitely axiomatizable in the finite
or countably infinite case; however, we do not yet have results about decidability
questions.
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